Joint Publication JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 25 March 2013

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Jointness of the Joint Force War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. Warfare is the mechanism, method, or modality of armed Joint Publication 1 is the capstone publication of the US joint doctrine hierarchy. It is a bridge between policy and doctrine and describes the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use and other operational matters derived from Title 10, United States Code USC.

The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of joint forces by providing fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces toward a common objective. Jointness implies cross-service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts the capability of individual components.

The joint force is a values based organization. The character, professionalism, and values of our military leaders have proven to be vital for operational success. War can result from the failure of states to resolve their disputes by diplomatic means. War historically involves nine principles, collectively and classically known as the principles of war objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.

Warfare continues to change and be transformed by society, diplomacy, politics, and technology. The US ix. It is the how of waging war. The US military recognizes two basic forms of warfare traditional and irregular. Levels of Warfare Campaigns and Operations Task, Function, and Mission military recognizes two basic forms of warfare traditional and irregular.

A useful dichotomy for thinking about warfare is the distinction between traditional and irregular warfare IW. Traditional warfare is characterized as a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. With the increasingly rare case of formally declared war, traditional warfare typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces SOF against each other in all physical domains as well as the information environment which includes cyberspace.

IW is characterized as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population s. In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force, which usually serves that nation s established government. While the various forms and methods of warfare are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the three levels of warfare strategic, operational, and tactical link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives.

There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. An operation may entail the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to achieve the objective of any battle or campaign. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

A task is a clearly defined action or activity assigned to an individual or organization. It is a specific assignment that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. A function is the broad, general, and enduring x JP 1. Mission entails the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore.

This environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing and disappearing. The strategic security environment presents broad national security challenges likely to require the employment of joint forces in the future.

The US military will undertake the following activities to deal with these challenges: secure the homeland, win the Nation s wars, deter our adversaries, security cooperation, support to civil authorities, and adapt to changing environment. The ability of the US to advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the United States Government USG in employing the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives.

The military instrument of national power can be used in a wide variety of ways that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity. These various ways can be understood to occur across a continuum of conflict ranging from peace to war. Mindful that the operational level of warfare connects the tactical to the strategic, and operations and campaigns are themselves scalable, the US uses the construct of the range of military operations to provide insight into the various broad usages of military power from a strategic perspective.

Although individual Services may plan and conduct operations to accomplish tasks and missions in support of Department of Defense DOD objectives, the primary way DOD employs two or more Services from two Military Departments in a single operation, particularly in combat, is through joint operations. Joint operations is the general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces in specified command relationships with each other.

There are significant challenges to effectively integrating and synchronizing Service and combat support agency CSA capabilities in joint operations. Functionally xi. These groupings, which we call joint functions, facilitate planning and employment of the joint force. In addition to command and control C2 , the joint functions include intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Joint Operation Planning Joint operation planning is the way the military links and transforms national strategic objectives into tactical actions. Law of War Joint operation planning provides a common basis for discussion, understanding, and change for the joint force, its subordinate and higher headquarters, the joint planning and execution community, and the national leadership.

In accordance with the Guidance for Employment of the Force GEF , adaptive planning supports the transition of DOD planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach. The Adaptive Planning and Execution APEX system facilitates iterative dialogue and collaborative planning between the multiple echelons of command. It is DOD policy that the Armed Forces of the United States will adhere to the law of war, often called the law of armed conflict, during all military operations.

The law of war is the body of law that regulates both the legal and customary justifications for utilizing force and the conduct of armed hostilities; it is binding on the US and its individual citizens. This direction leads to unified action. National policy and planning documents generally provide national strategic direction.

The national security strategy NSS provides a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. It describes the Armed Forces plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides a vision for maintaining a force capable of meeting future challenges.

The National Response Framework, developed by the Department of Homeland Security, establishes a comprehensive, national-level, all-hazards, all-discipline approach to domestic incident management. Unity of command within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic direction through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

The CJCS and all CCDRs are in pivotal positions to facilitate the planning and conduct of unified actions in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the President and SecDef in coordination with other authorities i. Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the combatant commands CCMDs were established in law. Functions are the appropriate assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization.

The President and SecDef exercise authority, direction, and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of C2. One branch runs from the xiii. For purposes other than the operational direction of the CCMDs, the chain of command runs from the President to SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and, as prescribed by the Secretaries, to the commanders of Military Service forces.

The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military Department. CCDRs prescribe the chain of command within their CCMDs and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of Service forces. Commanders of Service forces are responsible to Secretaries of the Military Departments through their respective Service Chiefs for the administration, training, and readiness of their unit s.

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The National Guard Bureau is responsible for ensuring that units and members of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are trained by the states to provide trained and equipped units to fulfill assigned missions in federal and non-federal statuses. In addition to the Services above, a number of DOD agencies provide combat support or combat service support to joint forces and are designated as CSAs. Unified action demands maximum interoperability.

The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively, in part through interoperability. CCDRs will ensure maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the CJCS, who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program. Interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between departments and agencies of the USG, including DOD, to accomplish an objective.

Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.

Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations are applicable to multinational operations. However, differences in laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language within alliances and coalitions must be considered. Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal.

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A coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as multinational force commanders authority over national logistics including infrastructure , rules of engagement, fratricide prevention, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ISR is essential for unity of effort. As prescribed by higher authority, DOD will maintain and employ Armed Forces to: support and defend the Constitution of the US against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the US, its territories, and areas vital to its interest; and uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the US.

Chief, National Guard Bureau. The global synchronizer s role is to align and harmonize plans and recommend sequencing of actions to achieve the strategic end states and objectives of a global campaign plan. Forces under the direction of the President or SecDef may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the CCDRs concerned or as specifically directed by the President or SecDef.

The Commander, US Strategic Command, is an FCC who is responsible to: Maintain primary responsibility among CCDRs to support the national objective of strategic deterrence; Provide integrated global strike planning; Synchronize planning for global missile defense; Plan, integrate, and coordinate ISR in support of strategic and global operations; Provide planning, training, and contingent electronic warfare support; Synchronize planning for DOD combating weapons of mass destruction; Plan and conduct space operations; Synchronize planning for cyberspace operations, and Provide in-depth analysis and precision targeting for selected networks and nodes.

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Commanders of unified combatant commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by SecDef through the CJCS. A unified combatant command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President through SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified CCMDs may establish subordinate unified commands also called subunified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified CCMDs.

A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. Although specific responsibilities will vary, a JFC possesses the following general responsibilities: Provide a clear commander s intent and timely communication of specified tasks, together with any required coordinating and reporting requirements. Transfer forces and other capabilities to designated subordinate commanders for accomplishing assigned tasks.

Provide all available information to subordinate JFCs and component commanders that affect their assigned missions and objectives. Delegate authority to subordinate JFCs and component commanders commensurate with their responsibilities. Staff of a Joint Force Service Component Commands Functional Component Commands A JFC is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

The composition of a joint staff should be commensurate with the composition of forces and the character of the contemplated operations to ensure that the staff understands the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each element of the force. A Service component command, assigned to a CCDR, consists of the Service component commander and the Service forces such as individuals, units, detachments, and organizations, including the support forces that have been assigned to that CCDR.

JFCs have the authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations. Discipline The JFC is responsible for the discipline of military personnel assigned to the joint organization. Matters that involve more than one Service and that are within the jurisdiction of the JFC may be handled either by the JFC or by the appropriate Service component commander. Matters that involve only one Service should be handled by the Service component commander, subject to Service regulations. Joint Command and Control Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.

Combatant Command Command Authority Operational Control Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law.

COCOM provides full authority for a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces , and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. OPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCMD and may be delegated within the command.

It is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative xx JP 1. Tactical Control Support There are four categories of support that a combatant commander may exercise over assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to accomplish mission objectives.

They are: general support, mutual support, direct support, and close support. Support Relationships Between Combatant Commanders Support Relationships Between Component Commanders Command Relationships and Assignment and Transfer of Forces TACON is an authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements and maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks assigned by the commander exercising OPCON or TACON of the attached force.

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a common superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the CCMD level. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority the common JFC is responsible for ensuring that both the supported commander and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted.

SecDef establishes support relationships between the CCDRs for the planning and execution of joint operations. This ensures that the supported CCDR receives the necessary support. The JFC may establish support relationships between component commanders to facilitate operations. Component commanders should establish liaison with other component commanders to facilitate the support relationship and to coordinate the planning and execution of pertinent operations. All forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of the Military Departments except those forces necessary to carry out the functions of the Military Departments as noted in Title 10, USC, Section are assigned to xxi.

Other Authorities Command of National Guard and Reserve Forces Command and Control of Joint Forces ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service e. Direct liaison authorized is that authority granted by a commander any level to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.

Those forces are available for operational missions when mobilized for specific periods in accordance with the law or when ordered to active duty and after being validated for employment by their parent Service. Normally, National Guard forces are under the commands of their respective governors in Title 32, USC, or state active duty status. Command is the most important role undertaken by a JFC. C2 ties together all the operational functions and tasks and applies to all levels of war and echelons of command.

Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans or via mission command. Unity of command is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets: clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships; mission command; information management and knowledge sharing; communication; timely decision making; coordination mechanisms; battle rhythm discipline; responsive, dependable, and interoperable support systems; situational awareness; and mutual trust.

Component and supporting commands organizations and capabilities must be integrated into a joint organization that enables effective and efficient joint C2. The JFC should be guided in this effort by the following principles: simplicity, span of control, unit integrity, and interoperability.

The nature, scope, and tempo of military operations continually changes, requiring the commander to make new decisions and take new actions in response to these changes. This may be viewed as part of a cycle, which is repeated when the situation changes significantly. Although the scope and details will vary with the level and function of the command, the purpose is constant: analyze the situation and need for action; determine the course of action COA best suited for mission accomplishment; and carry out that COA, with adjustments as necessary, while continuing to assess the unfolding situation.

A C2 support system, which includes interoperable supporting communications systems, is the JFC s principal tool used to collect, transport, process, share, and protect data and information. To facilitate the execution and processes of C2, military communications systems must furnish rapid, reliable, and secure information throughout the chain of command. The National Military Command System provides the means by which the President and SecDef can receive warning and intelligence so that accurate and timely decisions can be made, the resources of the Military Services can be applied, military missions can be xxiii.

The Nuclear Command and Control System supports the Presidential nuclear C2 of the CCMDs in the areas of integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, decision making, decision dissemination, and force management and report back. Defense Continuity Program The Defense Continuity Program is an integrated program composed of DOD policies, plans, procedures, assets, and resources that ensures continuity of DOD component mission-essential functions under all circumstances, including crisis, attack, recovery, and reconstitution.

Joint Force Development Principles of Joint Force Development Authorities Joint Force Development Joint Doctrine Joint force development entails the purposeful preparation of individual members of the Armed Forces and the units that they comprise to present a force capable of executing assigned missions. It includes joint doctrine, joint education, joint training, joint lessons learned, and joint concept development and assessment.

US law Title 10, USC, Section gives the CJCS authority regarding joint force development, specifically providing authority to develop doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces, and to formulate policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces to include polices for the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.

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  5. Jacoby, Jr. By Charles D. Allen and Edward J. By Matthew F. Cancian Commentary. By Ross F. By Paul Kingsbury Features. By Kevin D. By Christopher J. Lamb and Susan Stipanovich. By Patrick H. By James Hasik Recall. By David F. Winkler Book Reviews. By John T. By Michael J. Mazarr Joint Doctrine. By James C. McArthur et. By Richard E. Joint Force Quarterly T his article completes a trilogy on interorganizational cooperation—with a focus on the joint force perspective. The first article discussed civilian perspectives from across the U.

    Government and their challenges in working with the military and highlighted the potential benefits of enhancing unity of effort throughout the government. In the first two articles, we merged the terms for civilian-led departments , agencies , organizations , and groups into one single term: organizations. The sole purpose for consolidating these terms was to provide a simple, consistent expression to capture the entirety of nonmilitary personnel. Within the larger government, coordination may imply the presence of a hierarchical relationship where the higher authority directs coordination among organic and external organizations.

    This prospect often causes concerns for civilian organizations, particularly when the military is involved. Therefore, especially within diplomatic circles, the term collaboration is frequently used instead. Collaboration is more acceptable within the government since it implies the existence of parallel organizational processes working toward a common solution. However, to some humanitarian organizations, when this term is used in the context of working with the U.

    For those organizations, the term most commonly used is cooperation. Since the U. The term policy also needs clarification in the context of civilian policy or military strategic documents that influence joint doctrine. Unless otherwise stated, use of the term policy here refers to civilian policy. Lastly, we address the difference between the political and military use of the term doctrine. Civilians in the political sphere often use the term doctrine to describe a political policy for example, the Truman Doctrine, Monroe Doctrine, the responsibility to protect doctrine.

    This distinction may cause confusion when communicating with the joint force about joint doctrine, which the military uses to describe the documentation and maintenance of best practices used for guiding commanders and their staffs for the employment of military forces. Policy and joint doctrine each play unique roles in providing the objectives and frameworks under which organizations conduct operations. Accordingly, comprehension of the appropriate roles of policy and joint doctrine is essential to understanding how and why different organizations adapt to real world conditions. Advancement of interorganizational cooperation is directly impacted by the relationship between joint force development and policy development.

    Since the joint force is admittedly not a one-size-fits-all solution to U. As such, the Joint Staff J7 Joint Force Development Directorate performs five functions: joint doctrine, joint education, joint training, joint lessons learned, and joint concept development. The fundamental purpose of joint doctrine is to formally capture how the joint force carries out certain functions, which in turn prepare successive generations of warfighters to carry out and improve on best practices employed in different operational environments.

    Policy acknowledges joint doctrine but also provides an authoritative source for required actions—goals or objectives—or specific prohibitions, which guides the joint force to carry out operational functions in a legal and ethical manner, ultimately driving joint doctrine development. Policy and joint doctrine work together constructively to inform and assist DOD with joint force development and risk management assessments.

    Despite their separate and unique purposes, policy and joint doctrine offer critical synergies during the development of standardization for example, terminology, command relationships and commonality across DOD. Lack of agreement normally occurs during the development of joint doctrine, as various subject matter experts can often be unfamiliar with the joint doctrine and policy development process and the different role that each contributor plays.

    As joint doctrine plays a prominent role in influencing joint force development, many incorrectly assume that since civilian policy also influences joint force development, that policy is synonymous with joint doctrine. The fact is they are dissimilar; policy can provide an impetus for new practices, while joint doctrine provides a historically influenced and vetted repository of joint force best practices that serves as a starting point for the conduct of military operations. There is a great potential for disagreement between civilian organizations and DOD during development of crisis response options in situations where the joint force perceives that the desired investment of resources and preferred outcomes on the part of policymakers are at odds with the military courses of action.

    In these instances, an understanding of the relevant joint doctrine provides policymakers with a common foundation from which to discuss appropriate concepts and levels of risk. On the other hand, institutionally speaking, DOD planning in the absence of established joint doctrine can be challenging. For example, in , the U. As a result, the joint force defaulted to the closest concepts available even though they were inadequate to the particular situation. Despite prior recognition of the joint doctrine gap, the adaptation of mass atrocity doctrine into joint doctrine was developed subsequent to and as a direct result of actual policy developments.

    Due to its sheer size, no other U. Government organization operates with the same scope or scale as DOD; joint doctrine provides a standing framework for DOD organizations to function and from which to adapt over time. An understanding of the interplay in the roles of policy and joint doctrine is critical to ensuring effective adaptation within the joint force. New challenges in the future operating environment will require increased interorganizational cooperation to better align joint force capabilities with national policy decisions.

    The ability to integrate joint doctrine with civilian activities, or to at least have a fundamental understanding of civilian policy and procedure development, will help reduce planning, execution, and acquisition timelines when assessing courses of action and implementing them. Policy can arguably be viewed as easier, faster, and more responsive to short-term requirements, yet policy—just like joint doctrine—is not infallible since it too can be forced to adapt to real-world conditions.

    As the joint force develops its courses of action from a doctrinal foundation, ad hoc policy creation in support of political course corrections may create unintended consequences in interorganizational cooperation and unity of effort. This fact underscores the need for both political and military establishments to work together to align both policy and joint doctrine for efficient achievement of the desired strategic endstate.

    Interoperability between doctrine and rules-based workforces offers a means to produce military and civilian leaders who understand interorganizational cooperation and how to coordinate and build synergy. The authors presume for this discussion that most organizations are values-based—that is, they are made up of morals, attributes, or principles that guide mission selection, strategic planning, objective identification, and decisionmaking.

    These values-based organizations conduct activities guided by their organizational policies as implemented by their strategic documents, mandates, and administrative norms. Strategic documents generally guide both civilian and military organizational objectives, while policy documents determine the operational rules that impact routine business. It often is more protracted in nature than conventional operations although IW can also be a supporting effort in traditional war.

    IW can range from localized instability to a regional struggle, often with regional and strategic implications. Failure to accept an accurate and definitive definition of IW, which addresses the strategic implications of such actions and conditions, will limit any effort to institutionalize IW.

    In the past, the lack of a cohesive strategy has led to gaps in Army doctrine and professional military education.

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    This situation should not be repeated by misdiagnosing what IW entails by providing a definition that sets a foundation for the scope of warfare and activities outside of the traditional. Doctrine, training, and education on IW will increase understanding of irregular adversaries, the conditions which precede their growth, and how they achieve freedom of movement amongst a population. A comprehensive definition, as proposed, will provide the means to clearly identify the tenets needed to build a comprehensive strategy to institutionalize IW throughout the Army.

    One final perspective is that the term IW creates confusion at all levels of the military and should be removed from doctrine and lexicon for the purpose of clarity. The definition is also incongruent with other allied, joint, and Army doctrine. Simply defining something as irregular, cognitively and socially, separates conventional military forces from the Joint Operational Concept.

    According to the Joint Force Assessment for IW, the joint force struggles with a tendency to erroneously characterize capability decisions as either-or propositions: conventional or irregular. After finding that IW definitions in joint forums and working groups varied, and contradicted NATO usage, the Joint Warfighting Center study proposed deleting it from all joint publications. Multinational allies also discourage applying the term to describe conflict prevention and environmental shaping actions, such as the FID and SO activities in non-hostile environments.

    Any benchmark of traditional war against near-peers leads to binary, linear, sequential views discounting concurrency and complexity of other conflicts, with different characteristics. Army Doctrinal Publication ADP , Unified Land Operations, provides the framework for Army support of unified action by governmental and non-governmental entities via land operations.

    Army forces conduct decisive and sustainable land operations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, or defense support of civil authorities. Army forces conduct regular and IW against both conventional and hybrid threats. Given that the Army uses Decisive Action to conduct traditional and irregular warfare, logic dictates the Army conducts warfare , regardless of any joint doctrinal definition of IW.

    Finally, defining IW does little to affect gains in resources and authorities from Congress. Outside of periodic assessments from defense leadership, there exists no sustained national-level focus on resourcing IW, per se. House Resolution , introduced in June of , proposes a government office for stabilization, the definition for which describes potential irregular conditions:.

    Through legislative liaison and action, DoD should codify definitions and concepts in public law, instead of relying on contradictory joint and service doctrine, or fulfilling a Joint Operating Concept which lacks any potential to garner future resources in a fiscally-constrained environment. However, to change the law, one must first influence legislators.

    To do that, skeptics would say, you have to make it politically tenable and valuable to advocate IW. This is difficult when IW requires less of the platforms and technology which drive manufacturing, jobs, economic impact, and ostensibly, congressional district votes. The dollar amounts show no political or financial capital in IW, so DoD defines it for a deaf audience. Resolution is a process example which actually drives national-level debate and resourcing, while explicitly defining defense activities required by the American people via Congress.

    In summary, defining IW detracts from doctrinal clarity by cognitively and professionally segregating conventional forces from problems perceived as irregular. Joint definitions are also incongruent with adversarial views of warfare, Army doctrine for Decisive Action, Allied doctrine, and the American interagency community. Although required for development of military concepts, capability, and strategy, a vague definition adds nothing to the national level debates on resourcing, authorities, and permissions. Less is more; clarity is achieved by removing terms that do not add to our understanding of the operating environment.

    IW is most certainly one of those terms. It is widely agreed that there is confusion on what IW means and where it belongs within joint and Army doctrine. It can be argued that there are numerous technical flaws that render the definition unhelpful in the formulation of policy and doctrine. The current lack of clarity could result in duplicated or conflicting efforts across the DOD enterprise.

    Worst case, the continued confusion could stall the formulation of new strategies and doctrine for the future and failure to capture and institutionalize the hard learned lessons in our most recent conflicts. Feedback would be greatly appreciated and utilized to inform further research and writing on this topic. Please send responses to the following email, usarmy. Coons and Glenn M. Key related activities include strategic communications, information operations, psychological operations, civil-military operations, support law enforcement, intelligence, and counter-intelligence. Washington: Government Printing Office, May 11, , Available at: www.

    Accessed 9 September Per the House report, requested Section funding for building partner capacity, i. UW is not specifically addressed , and Stability Operations are discussed across a patchwork of sectors outside of the scope of this paper. Text as of Jun 28, Introduced.

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    IWC synchronizes and assists in the development of IW and Countering Irregular Threats CIT enterprises to support a coherent Army strategy that accounts for building partner capacity, stability operations and the integration of unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. I'm sure my last post qualifies as a rant. Ok if it makes sense. I don't entirely disagree with other comments posted, but I disagree with what seems like the assertion that we shouldn't have this discussion. Concur that the article is wordy; feels like an attempt to do due diligence with respect to research. There is a compelling argument to be made for 'no definition' using logic that war is war.

    Then we only have to worry about defining specific activities like COIN, FID, stability operations, etc, vice grouping or categorizing these activities under an umbrella like IW. I agree that the military sometimes seems to 'reinvent' or develop new doctrine without considering what we already have or used in the past. Good example of this is the recent development of the new COIN joint pub.

    On another note, the U. P and others that COIN was successful. Success is not seeing the repeat of in It may be in the U. Sorry, didn't mean for my post to turn into a "rant". The other main point I was trying to make was that if we, within the professional military, read our history and stuck to long established and well defined terms that have already existed for the contingencies we have been dealing with in the last decade plus, maybe we wouldn't be constantly re-inventing the wheel not to mention creating a continued avalanche of new terms and acronyms that might sound catchy and make the person appear highly "original" but in my opinion it only serves to often confuse and add to the mountain of already well established theories and terms that have existed for years.

    Nothing we face today is really new, it's just taken center stage due to events over the last decade plus the never ending garage of the 24 hour news cycle with instantaneous information dissemination. This limited the exploration of old and new ideas related to a perhaps flawed concept. admin